The political logic of the Rajapaksa power grab, brief thoughts:-
The withdrawal of the Attorney General's appeal of the acquittal of the BBS' Gnaanaasaara in the Calvary Church attack case is another expected move under the new (if brief) MR regime. This reversal of the prosecution is as obvious as the attempt to transfer that CID officer off his current cases:- these are all (as anticipated) moves by the Mahinda faction to rollback all threats to MR, his family, his associates and allies/proxies. This is the primary reason for the MR faction of the UPFA to use its revived alliance with the Sirisena faction of the UPFA to seize power at this juncture rather than wait for the RanilW/UNF government to further lose its popularity and political legitimacy.
Given the naively and narrowly monetarist policies of the UNP-led UNF, the next Budget would certainly have added to its unpopularity and, with its continued anti-social economic programme, weakened its political legitimacy. But there are several criminal prosecutions coming up in December-February involving several key people ranging from MR himself to family and political/bureaucratic associates. This is, partly, what has motivated MR into this grab for power using his revived alliance with Sirisena. It is a programme of roll-back of these cases and probes that is the principal reason for the power grab.
As to why all of this happened is another whole story of the UNP's naively stupid political strategy within the National Unity government of isolating and undermining the political legitimacy of Sirisena and his faction of the UPFA which is the rival 'SLFP' sharing power with the UNP in the coalition regime. This ridiculously one-dimensional strategy is not only amateurish but also totally party/RW-oriented and, completely betrayed the UNP-UNF's popular mandate to GOVERN IN COALITION (with the SLFP) for this whole term to undertake the mending of the State and the national political dynamics (including war recovery and ethnic peace) after the depredations of the MR regime. Of course that is another story.
By the time of last February's local govt elections, it was already far too late to change tactics - the outcome was already predictable at the time. Again, the amateurish UNP thought it would wriggle through, but was taught a lesson. Today, the UNP dares not face an election.
The secretive nature of the power grab may have slightly harmed MR's political legitimacy. Since it had to be done suddenly/rapidly, the MR group could not, at all, do the necessary propaganda build up to legitimise the constitutionally controversial move. This seems to have resulted in a slight weakening of its own (Sinhala) power base. Nevertheless, a future general election is likely to enable the UPFA/SLPP retain its electoral edge. In any case, the MR-UPFA has no other option if it is not to further drain away its political legitimacy.
There are two other interesting possibilities in relation to the impending general election:- (1) the TNA, ITAK and other Thamil parties as well as the SLMC, do not want elections because (a) the new Viknesvaran combine is likely to overtake (if not decimate) the older Thamil parties and (b) the Bathiurdeen and other new Muslim (Moor) politicians will do the same to the SLMC/NUA; (2) the slight de-legitimising of the UNP, SLFP, SLPP is likely to greatly help the JVP which could, at long last, come into its parliamentary own through a general election. This is because the de-legitimising of the traditional bourgeois political establishment (and their personalities) is opening up a space for the entry of new forces, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary.
The withdrawal of the Attorney General's appeal of the acquittal of the BBS' Gnaanaasaara in the Calvary Church attack case is another expected move under the new (if brief) MR regime. This reversal of the prosecution is as obvious as the attempt to transfer that CID officer off his current cases:- these are all (as anticipated) moves by the Mahinda faction to rollback all threats to MR, his family, his associates and allies/proxies. This is the primary reason for the MR faction of the UPFA to use its revived alliance with the Sirisena faction of the UPFA to seize power at this juncture rather than wait for the RanilW/UNF government to further lose its popularity and political legitimacy.
Given the naively and narrowly monetarist policies of the UNP-led UNF, the next Budget would certainly have added to its unpopularity and, with its continued anti-social economic programme, weakened its political legitimacy. But there are several criminal prosecutions coming up in December-February involving several key people ranging from MR himself to family and political/bureaucratic associates. This is, partly, what has motivated MR into this grab for power using his revived alliance with Sirisena. It is a programme of roll-back of these cases and probes that is the principal reason for the power grab.
As to why all of this happened is another whole story of the UNP's naively stupid political strategy within the National Unity government of isolating and undermining the political legitimacy of Sirisena and his faction of the UPFA which is the rival 'SLFP' sharing power with the UNP in the coalition regime. This ridiculously one-dimensional strategy is not only amateurish but also totally party/RW-oriented and, completely betrayed the UNP-UNF's popular mandate to GOVERN IN COALITION (with the SLFP) for this whole term to undertake the mending of the State and the national political dynamics (including war recovery and ethnic peace) after the depredations of the MR regime. Of course that is another story.
By the time of last February's local govt elections, it was already far too late to change tactics - the outcome was already predictable at the time. Again, the amateurish UNP thought it would wriggle through, but was taught a lesson. Today, the UNP dares not face an election.
The secretive nature of the power grab may have slightly harmed MR's political legitimacy. Since it had to be done suddenly/rapidly, the MR group could not, at all, do the necessary propaganda build up to legitimise the constitutionally controversial move. This seems to have resulted in a slight weakening of its own (Sinhala) power base. Nevertheless, a future general election is likely to enable the UPFA/SLPP retain its electoral edge. In any case, the MR-UPFA has no other option if it is not to further drain away its political legitimacy.
There are two other interesting possibilities in relation to the impending general election:- (1) the TNA, ITAK and other Thamil parties as well as the SLMC, do not want elections because (a) the new Viknesvaran combine is likely to overtake (if not decimate) the older Thamil parties and (b) the Bathiurdeen and other new Muslim (Moor) politicians will do the same to the SLMC/NUA; (2) the slight de-legitimising of the UNP, SLFP, SLPP is likely to greatly help the JVP which could, at long last, come into its parliamentary own through a general election. This is because the de-legitimising of the traditional bourgeois political establishment (and their personalities) is opening up a space for the entry of new forces, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary.
